Episodes from the story of the hospitals of the Warsaw Uprising

Throughout the entire period of Poland’s wartime occupation by Nazi Germany, 1939–1945, the activities of the nation’s medical services attended and paralleled its military defensive and resistance effort. Very many members of the medical staff of Warsaw’s hospitals were engaged in the underground resistance movement, offering their services to the combatants and preparing hospital facilities for the outbreak of an armed uprising.¹

Warsaw was an independent territorial unit within the network of the Polish underground resistance organisation, and the head of the city’s medical services was Lt.-Col. Henryk Lenk,² (nom-de-guerre Bakcyl), who managed the entire system assisted by seven physicians acting as administrators for the medical services in their respective districts.

On 26 July 1944, when the stand-by alert³ was issued, the chief physicians responsible for the respective districts were as follows: 1. Dr Czesław Zbigniew Błeszyński (nom-de-guerre Staruszek), for Żoliborz; 2. Capt. Cyprian Sadowski, MD (nom-de-guerre Skiba), for Wola; 3. Capt. Leon Kuliszewski, MD, for Śródmieście (the City Centre); 4. Dr Klemens Gerner for Mokotów; 5. Maj. Mieczysław Ropek, MD, for Praga; 6. Dr Jan Goldman-Zaborowski, for Ochota; and 7. Dr Jan Dorożyński (nom-de-guerre Adam) for the Powiat of Warsaw (viz. the suburban area).

The district chief physicians were responsible for the medical and sanitary arrangements on their territory, including human and material resources available for the combat units in their district, the establishment of first-aid units, and arrangements for hospitalisation.

There was a sufficient number of municipal hospitals in the city to cater for presumable needs in the event of intensive fighting; there were also numerous German military hospitals which could provide medical care for insurgents if Polish combat forces took over the city. The hospitals were not evenly distributed in all the districts, so the plan was to establish field hospitals in those areas where there was no municipal hospital nearby. That was the situation in Żoliborz and Ochota. The location of these two districts and the potential problems with evacuation from them made it imperative to have field hospitals on their territory.

The preliminary plans envisaged a few days of fighting in the municipal area, and hence the medical preparations accommodated to this scheme seemed realistic enough. But the way the Uprising developed faced the medical service with an extremely challenging problem, forcing it to improvise all of its undertakings. The city’s hospitals were not spared the fate of their localities, and within a short spell of time most could no longer perform the duties required of them. The Uprising turned into a set of dispersed foci of fighting, isolated off from one another with no communication between them or potential for evacuation. The districts ceased to be integrated territorial units and were dissected by lines of combat or pockmarked with enclaves of enemy positions. Some hospitals found themselves beyond the reach of insurgent forces or on the fringes of combat areas. The Uprising slowly declined, and so did the part played by its hospitals. Their work came to an end—and this applied even to those hospitals which had made a substantial contribution to meet the medical needs of the insurgents.

Ochota was the first district to fall. From the very outset it had been obliged to improvise, since it was unable to evacuate its wounded to the Child Jesus Hospital.⁴ The next to share its fate was Wola, followed by Stare Miasto (the Old Town), which in the course of developments had been cut off from the rest of the City Centre. Then it was the turn of Mokotów and Żoliborz. This was the order in which the activities of the insurgents’ permanent and makeshift hospitals reached an end.

Wola had one facility, Wolski Hospital, which was fully ready ahead of the needs of the Uprising, and a further three, the Karol and Maria, St. Lazarus’ on the Górczewska, and St. Stanislaus’ Infectious Diseases Hospital on the Wolska,⁵ which were quickly adapted to cater for these needs. The tragic story of these hospitals has been related in numerous publications, such as the memoirs of Battalion Zośka⁶ veterans and Z. Woźniewski’s books,⁷ so all that needs to be added here is that when the first German assault petered out, Wolski Hospital became the central venue for all the wounded and medical personnel evacuated from other parts of the city. This hospital provided medical care for thousands of casualties, who were later evacuated along with all of the equipment and much of its furnishings. Wolski Hospital continued operations in its ulica Wolska premises until 25 October, when it was evacuated to several suburban locations, thanks to the initiative and endeavours of Dr Janina Misiewicz, whose article we published in the 1967 edition of Przegląd Lekarski – Oświęcim. Many of the hospital’s staff returned to Warsaw straight after the city’s liberation and put in a tremendous amount of effort to restore and reopen the hospital. It was the first hospital in left-bank Warsaw to resume its work, already in February 1945.

Stare Miasto (the Old Town), which constituted an independent territorial combat entity due to the front line that separated it off from neighbouring areas, had two hospitals, the Maltese Hospital (Szpital Maltański) on the Senatorska, and St. John’s Hospital (Szpital Św. Jana Bożego) on the Bonifraterska. St. John’s, which was a psychiatric hospital, was fully adapted to cater for the needs of the Uprising. Its director, Dr Adolf Falkowski,⁸ made use of the anti-aircraft defence system to set up a fully equipped operating theatre in an air raid shelter and managed to accumulate a large stock of medicines and dressings, as well as food. The local medical personnel was augmented by new arrivals from other parts of the city, including a couple of distinguished surgeons, Professor Wincenty Tomaszewicz (1876–1965) and Col. Bronisław Stroński, MD (1887–1952). Dr Falkowski’s closest collaborator for the hospital’s administrative work was Dr Franciszek Szumigaj. The first relatively quiet days let the hospital continue its normal activities and admit numerous casualties from diverse sections, even from Wola. However, as combat, shelling, and German assaults against the hospital intensified, its premises found themselves directly on the line of fire. There were several air raids (despite the fact that the building was clearly marked as a hospital), which made evacuation inevitable.

On 13 August, on orders from Lt.-Col. Tarło, MD,⁹ who had been appointed head of the medical services for the Old Town a few days before, the entire hospital was evacuated. Having been used as the northernmost redoubt in this part of the city, the hospital building was set on fire and turned into a ruin. Dr Halina Jankowska, who volunteered to stay behind with a group of psychiatric patients, was killed by falling debris when a mine exploded and destroyed the building’s walls. The incident has been described by Małgorzata Dominik in the 1967 issue of Przegląd Lekarski – Oświęcim. The evacuees were sent to other, established and new, makeshift hospitals.

The Old Town’s second medical unit was the Maltese Hospital, which had been set up during the defence campaign of September 1939 and had managed to survive throughout the war years. It was well equipped to face the challenge of the Uprising and ready by the early hours of 1 August to assume these duties. Dr Jerzy Dreyza, its head and leader of its mostly military medical staff, was notified in advance of the announcement of Hour W¹⁰ and issued a stand-by alert. This hospital was covered by the anti-aircraft operation and had an appropriately equipped operating theatre in an air raid shelter, with a sufficient amount of resources at its disposal.

When the fighting started, its team of surgeons headed by Dr Wacław Żebrowski (nom-de-guerre Wacław, 1904–1944) and Dr Stanisław Gierałtowski (1904–1990), were ready to commence their duties. At first there were not very many casualties, but numbers surged when Wola fell and the Germans launched an attack along ul. Elektoralna. On 5 August Col. Leon Strehl, head of the medical services attached to AK Headquarters, arrived from Wola. Having seen the situation in this part of the city, he appointed Dr Tarło chief medical officer for the area. At this time, there were about 250 casualties, including 20 POWs, in the Maltese Hospital.

In view of the impending danger, a gradual process of evacuation started on the western fringes of the area. The wounded were removed to makeshift hospitals in the centre of this part of town. On 8 August the danger materialised in the form of enemy armoured vehicles firing at the hospital. German troops entered the building and occupied it for a time. However, the wounded POWs who were in care at this hospital intervened on its behalf, and there were no outrages. On the same day, Stanisław Milewski-Lipkowski, one of the hospital’s founders, was seriously wounded.

By 14 August the hospital was wedged between the lines of fire and was able to maintain communications with the rear only by means of breaks in its walls and the passages through them to the outside world. On that day one of Dirlewanger’s¹¹ SS units entered the hospital premises. At first, no orders were issued, and it was not until the Germans had exchanged fire several times with the insurgents that the German commanding officer, SS Obersturmführer Lagan, ordered everyone to leave the building, but did not specify either the way the evacuation was to be done, or the direction it was to take. Col. Strehl and some of his physicians (Drs Cyryl Jan Mockałło, noms-de-guerre Czesław and Korczak; Dr Szczepan “Podolski” Wacek (1895-1980), and Dr Stanisław Gierałtowski) collected together a group of stretcher-carriers, mostly civilians, as well as all manner of stretchers, and the column of casualties set off via the Saxon Garden¹² for ul. Królewska. The Germans allowed this strange procession to leave, maybe thanks to Col. Strehl’s fluent German. He told them that he had orders to join the Ujazdowski Hospital.

After crossing the insurgents’ lines along ul. Królewska, the wounded were sent to various hospitals in the City Centre, most of them on ul. Śniadeckich. The Germans told us to accommodate the rest in the basement of the ul. Senatorska hospital, but after a short time they issued a hasty evacuation order, sending us to Wolski hospital. Dr Dreyza conducted the column of casualties to that hospital fairly peacefully. However, when they got there, they failed to find the first group of evacuees. No-one knew what had happened to them.

So, when the activities of its two permanent, well-prepared hospitals had come to an end, the Old Town was left only with makeshift medical stations, on a rapidly shrinking area exposed to continual devastation by heavy enemy fire.

Powiśle, which operated as an independent territorial unit of the Old Town district, acquired a separate status in the course of fighting and had to fend for itself in every respect. The Social Insurance Hospital¹³ situated in this area was in the hands of the Germans and unavailable to insurgents for the entire duration of the fighting.

The rest of the hospitals in the Old Town—the Polish Red Cross Hospital¹⁴ at No. 10, ul. Smolna; the Ophthalmic Institute,¹⁵ at No. 4, ul. Smolna; and the Warsaw Children’s Hospital¹⁶ on ul. Kopernika—were unable to perform their envisaged role, for various reasons. The Germans had burned down the Ophthalmic Institute on 4 August, and its director, Prof. Władysław Melanowski, moved what remained of its resources to residential premises at No. 10, ul. Pierackiego (now Foksal). The Children’s Hospital was located on the same line of fire and all it was good for were ancillary purposes. The Polish Red Cross Hospital, the biggest and best prepared of them for the Uprising, commenced its work straightaway within the first hours of combat. Under the leadership of Dr Henryk Cetkowski, its team of physicians, Drs Zdzisław Zajączkowski, Stanisław Królikowski, Wojciech Staszewski, and Zygmunt Młynarski, assisted by its qualified nursing staff and student nurses led by Matron Poznańska and Circulating Nurse Bożena Chadaj, started dispensing medical care to insurgents as soon as the first casualties arrived.

Helping a Fellow Prisoner. Marian Kołodziej. Photo by Piotr Markowski. Click to enlarge.

However, the hospital’s location between a viaduct and the cross-city railway line was problematic from the point of view of accessibility for the various combat units as well as communication between its sundry buildings, which came under enemy fire already on 3 August. The Germans launched a barrage from the bridges on the viaduct as well as from an armoured train moving back and forth along the line. In outcome the hospital’s No. 1, 2, 6, and 7 Pavilions were burned down.

On 6 August an SS unit entered and occupied the hospital. They drove all the people into the main hall and were about to carry out a mass execution. The people were saved by Dr Cetkowski, who took his Iron Cross ID card out of his pocket and held it up in front of the commanding officer’s face. He had been awarded it for bravery during the First World War,¹⁷ and now he was ashamed of it, as the inheritors of that uniform, which he, too, had once worn, were in breach of the law of war, shooting civilians and casualties. Contrary to all expectation, the commander stopped the execution and withdrew all the other repressive measures. He even tried to provide excuses for the assault on the hospital and advised Dr Cetkowski to evacuate the wounded and hospital equipment to a safer place, well away from the combat area.

So there was no option but to quickly evacuate and transfer the casualties and hospital equipment to No. 11 and 12, ul. Kopernika. As of 6 August, all the Powiśle area had available in the way of medical care were makeshift, surrogate hospitals.

The hospital facility in Region 2 of the City Centre, which neighboured on Powiśle and covered part of Czerniaków, was the well-equipped Social Insurance Hospital on the Ludna–Czerniakowska street corner. Dr Irena Semadeni-Konopacka (nom-de-guerre Konstancja) was appointed military commander of this hospital. Nearly all of its large and highly qualified staff, under the leadership of Prof. Zdzisław Gorecki, MD, reported for service. The first days of August were relatively quiet in this part of the city, and the hospital could work on an almost normal basis. However, by 4–6 August, when the Germans took control of both the viaducts in the area and the armoured train started its operations, the hospital found itself on the line of fire and its building was barraged several times, despite the fact that it was clearly marked with Red Cross symbols as a hospital.

Konstancja decided to move the wounded and other patients to the basement and began preparations to set up an alternative facility in a safer area. A few days later, the casualties were transferred to a new, makeshift hospital in a sturdy building at No. 2, ul. Okrąg. This medical facility managed to continue its operations until the very end of the fighting.

The building of the Social Insurance Hospital was exposed to constant heavy gunfire and went through several air raids. It was gradually turning into a heap of ruins, especially on its north side. Life went on surreptitiously only in its basement, which served as a shelter for its staff and the patients still left inside. In the final phase of the fighting, when the ruins of this hospital and the neighbouring buildings turned into an outpost of defence, wounded insurgents were given first aid in the hospital basement and subsequently sent out into the rear via an escape tunnel. On 15 September a couple of heavy bombs fell on the hospital ruins. 60 people, including Prof. Gorecki, Dr Wanda Kozakiewicz-Grochalska, Dr Mikołaj Dziewanowski, Dr Tatiana Dziewanowska, Dr Zofia Pęska-Mizerkowa, and Dr Stanisław Trawiński, were crushed to death by the falling debris. Staying in the gutted ruins would have been tantamount to a death sentence, especially as fighting in the neighbourhood was intensifying. Thanks to the courage, initiative, and self-sacrificing attitude of the staff still left alive (most of them nurses and female orderlies), assisted by a fortuitous group of civilians, the patients and wounded who had survived the bomb attacks were whisked away by night and brought to St. Casimir’s Convent in Powiśle, where the Germans had established a collecting point for the wounded from Powiśle and the Old Town. A total of 120 persons were evacuated. Dr Konstancja’s hospital, and another medical facility in the southern part of the area, Dr Piotr Załęski’s makeshift but well-equipped hospital, continued to dispense medical care to wounded insurgents right until the end of combat.

Mokotów, the southernmost district, had poor hospital resources. There were two large hospitals in this district, but their location gave no guarantee that they would be of any use during combat. So it is surprising and hard to understand why the doctor appointed district chief physician by the underground resistance movement made no arrangements to establish an alternative hospital for insurgents. The facility on ul. Chocimska was an isolation hospital for infectious diseases and would have been quite easy to adapt, but it was in a neighbourhood that was German-controlled from the very outset.

On the other hand, the Hospital of the Sisters of St. Elizabeth¹⁸ on ul. Goszczyńskiego had been used since the Germans had occupied the city as a medical facility for German civilians and had all the required resources, which the Germans had not managed to evacuate when it was taken over by the insurgents. It was situated in a very outlying location with respect to the rest of the district. Within the first hours of falling into the hands of the insurgents, the hospital was put under military command and augmented with new medical personnel (Dr Kajetan Pietraszkiewicz as commanding officer, Dr Maria Łężyńska, Dr Jan Raczyński, Dr Jan Wyszogrodzki, and Dr Piotr Słonimski), who started work with the hospital’s team of nurses; however, the main burden of responsibility for dispensing medical assistance to casualties fell on the shoulders of the medical staff of the Baszta Regiment of insurgents. Baszta had a lot of combat experience in sabotage, and from the time the first shots were fired its regimental medics, Dr Tadeusz Jankowski as chief physician, and surgeon Dr Eustachy Słobodzian, provided a high quality of care to wounded insurgents. The worst situation was in Lower Mokotów, which had no permanent first-aid stations, and until the Ujazdowski Hospital was evacuated to this neighbourhood, had to send all of its wounded in need of specialist care to the Hospital of the Sisters of St. Elizabeth.

The situation in the district of Mokotów proper did not improve until Dr Edward Loth, the new chief physician for the district, appointed Dr Stanisław Radwan, who had been sent to the district with him, to organise a group of field hospitals.

The team working at the time in the hospital on ul. Goszczyńskiego used all of its surgical equipment and resources to help the seriously wounded, who were then accommodated in neighbouring houses. Very few of the wards in the hospital itself could be used because the building was constantly under fire. Due to its peripheral location, it was exposed to an increasing extent of mortar and artillery barrage as the Germans moved northward and eastward.

The worst for the staff and patients still in the hospital came on 29 Augus¹⁹t. On that day its buildings were the target of an artillery and mine assault, as well as an air raid. The staff immediately started to evacuate the wounded and managed to complete the task despite the conditions, which were getting worse and worse. 40 of the wounded and 20 members of the staff lost their lives during the operation. These included Dr Maria Łężyńska, Dr Irena Dębska, Dr Piotr Słonimski, and Jan Ferdyan. Only a first-aid station was left in the basement, and all the patients were sent to a variety of makeshift hospitals all over the neighbourhood, where they stayed until the end of hostilities.

Ujazdowski Hospital was evacuated from ul. Górnośląska to Lower Mokotów and resumed its work on ul. Chełmska, albeit there, too, it was exposed to artillery fire and air raids. Effectively it found itself wedged between two lines of combat, but continued to provide a medical service until mid-September. Two heavy air raids on 11 and 15 September wrecked the hospital buildings, demolishing them right down to the basements and killing hundreds of wounded patients, medical staff, and fugitives under the debris. There was no point in staying in what were now gutted ruins, and a group of about 20 surviving staff and patients evacuated to the main part of Mokotów, only to share in the fate of this district.

Żoliborz was the only district in the municipal region not have a single permanent insurgents’ hospital on its territory. The Germans had established a field hospital in the building of the Prince Poniatowski Grammar School,²⁰ but it could only have been made available for the Uprising if Polish combat units managed to take control of the area. So all the medical resources Żoliborz had at its disposal were two large makeshift hospitals, which were set up in an exemplary way. One was located in the convent boarding school run by the Sisters of the Resurrection on ul. Krasińskiego; and the other was in the Army Family Home²¹ on plac Inwalidów. Both accomplished their mission. So, too, did the little hospital at Laski²² that catered for the insurgent units deployed in the Kampinos Forest.²³

The part of the city which functioned during the Uprising as the “Old Town,” with Aleje Jerozolimskie running across it, in theory had a sufficient number of hospital beds at its disposal. There were several large hospitals on its territory, a few smaller units, and a couple of private hospitals. However, in the course of the Uprising, two of the large hospitals (Ujazdowski and the Child Jesus Hospital) were cut off from the area controlled by the insurgents, while St. Roche’s Hospital²⁴ was located directly on the line of fire. This left the Paediatric Clinic,²⁵ which was reorganising following its move from ul. Litewska to ul. Śliska, as the only permanent hospital in the district providing a medical service for the insurgents.

In the first couple of days of the Uprising, the Child Jesus Hospital admitted wounded insurgents, civilians, and German soldiers from units in the area, even though it was under fire from ul. Oczki and Nowogrodzka. However, when Ukrainian troops²⁶ occupied the whole of the hospital’s premises, it was obvious that it had to suspend all of its work. The buildings on its north and east side were converted into firing positions onto ul. Chałubińskiego and Nowogrodzka, while the rest of its facilities and patients’ wards were turned into residential quarters. There were numerous incidents of rape, robbery, and murder.

On 26 August, when there was a total of about 1,600 patients in all of the hospital’s pavilions including the gynaecology and obstetrics clinic, the Germans issued an evacuation order. It was done in several stages. The first group, about 200 persons including Dr Marian Pertkiewicz and Dr Józef Rydygier, left on 26 August. They were put on the suburban railway for Brwinów and left to their own devices when they reached their destination. On the following days more groups were sent out to Tworki,²⁷ but as they could not be accommodated there, they were sent to any lodgings that happened to be available but were not adapted to cater for wounded patients, at Milanówek, Brwinów, and other places along the suburban line. The staff and casualties in the nursing college on ul. Koszykowa, which was affiliated to the hospital, were evacuated as well. The Germans took over the college building already on 2 August, having forced an entry by knocking holes in the walls of the adjoining Ministry of Communications building. When combat ceased on 2 October, an assembly point was set up in the Child Jesus Hospital for patients, invalids, and the elderly who needed assistance to leave the city.²⁸

There was a similar situation in Ujazdowski Hospital, which could not be of much service to the Uprising, either. It admitted only a handful of casualties in the first few hours of combat, but subsequently found itself strictly under German control until 6 August, when the Germans ordered it to evacuate.

So, the only hospital facility available to insurgents on the territory of this district for the entire duration of the fighting was the Children’s Clinic at No. 51, ul. Śliska. In spite of the fact that it was under constant fire and situated in a part of the city with a considerable air raid risk, this hospital performed 1,600 major surgeries and treated over 2,000 less serious injuries. The last three weeks of its work were conducted in its basement, after the street-level part of its buildings had been destroyed. Its team of doctors—Jan Kossakowski, Wanda Paradowska, Leokadia Młynarczyk, Rajmund Barański, Maria Mazurkiewicz, Kornel Żabski, and Józef Dryjski—and nurses—Regina Podgórska, Maria Skopkówna, and others—stayed in this hospital right until the evacuation, which was carried out by the Polish Red Cross.

A team of highly qualified specialists worked for the entire duration of the Uprising in Sano, a private hospital at No. 13, ul. Lwowska. Under the leadership of Prof. Wiktor Dega, Drs Marian Stefanowski, Edward Barcz, Eugeniusz Zachwiej, Zbigniew Lewicki, Andrzej Biernacki, and Radzisław Tchórznicki adapted the resources of this small gynaecological clinic to the needs of surgery and for the entire period of combat used it as a top-quality surgical facility providing treatment for fairly complicated injuries.

As the stories of the Warsaw hospitals I have related above show, the medical service working for the Uprising pursued its activities largely on the basis of improvisation. The question arises to what extent the insurgents’ medical service met the expectations and accomplished the tasks required of it, and whether anything could have been done to avoid improvisation. The duties, aims, and measures taken by the insurgents’ medical service were planned on the basis of the instructions given to particular combat units. The insurgents wanted to take control of the city by attacking at night, and the targets they selected were the premises of the main German institutions and administrative offices, German warehouses, SS and police stations, airfields, railway stations and bridges, radio broadcasting stations, the main post office, and telecommunications exchange stations.

For the insurgents, achieving these aims would have been tantamount to taking control of the whole city along with its suburban foreground, maintaining communications between its diverse wards and districts, and would have given them access to all the goods stored in the city’s warehouses, and all of its transport and communications facilities. The course the developments took did not give the Uprising a chance to meet even a fraction of these aims. The decision to launch an uprising in Warsaw harked back to the original concept of a nationwide insurrection, but activated in circumstances which were now very different from the political and military point of view. This is what made the military aspect of the Uprising a hasty and improvised venture, not a well-planned operation. The drastically disproportionate forces available to the two belligerents compelled the insurgents to adopt a desperate series of defensive operations hemmed in on narrow enclaves of municipal territory and sustaining heavy losses. There was neither operational nor tactical coherence. In these circumstances, the medical service had no chance to work on the basis of the plans that had been adopted earlier, and was left with continual improvisation as its only option. On many occasions its permanent hospitals became targets for enemy fire from ground-level assaults and air raids, which only highlighted the barbaric means of warfare conducted by the Germans. Their flagrant violations of the Geneva Convention forced the hospitals to evacuate and disperse over a wide area.

Hundreds of hospitals big and small²⁹ emerged in diverse foci of combat. These widespread activities were possible only thanks to the general nature the Uprising assumed—definitely against the wishes and intentions of its leaders—but in a situation of enforced decisions and measures that turned into a heroic and fully committed effort on the part of all of Warsaw’s inhabitants, regardless of military affiliation, social background, or political views. It was only thanks to the fact that this was the nature of the Uprising that its medical service could continue its work and accomplish impressive results in the face of enforced improvisation. The boundless extent of self-sacrifice on the part of Varsovians, who unstintingly gave up their premises, beds and bed linen, nightwear and clothing, medications and dressings, and shared their meagre stocks of food with the casualties, doctors and nurses—enabled the medical teams to work in truly battlefield conditions and helped them dispense genuine medical care to the injured and save lives. The spontaneous readiness of all the doctors, nurses, and orderlies,³⁰ who straightaway offered their services ensured the combatants of a committed workforce to man the hospitals and first aid stations activated in diverse parts of the city.

We cannot give the exact figures for the casualties and patients who received medical care during the Warsaw Uprising. The best we can do is to give a very rough estimate of the number of soldiers who were injured or fell ill. The basis for this estimate is the evacuation data for 4, 7, and 8 October. On those three days a total of 1,795 casualties and patients were evacuated from the city. About 2,500 were still left in the care of the Polish Red Cross in several hospitals. About 1,000 casualties were evacuated from Żoliborz, and about 650 from Mokotów. No fewer than 2,500 were marooned in the fiercest vortex of fighting in the Old Town, and most of them were doomed to die at the hands of German soldiery. About 450 were in the hospitals of Czerniaków on the day that district fell, and about 1,000 managed to get out of the city at various times and by various routes (from Sadyba and the Child Jesus Hospital via Wolski Hospital). Thus, a very rough estimate of the casualties (I mean only the seriously injured in insurgents’ hospitals) would be about 9,895.³¹

In his estimate for the end of September, the head of the Uprising’s medical services, Col. Chirurg,³² gave a figure of 6,500 for the casualties in the hospitals. This was without those trapped in the Old Town and the losses of the last couple of days. The majority of the doctors, including a number of distinguished surgeons, quickly adjusted to the primitive conditions in which they had to work and the shortage of instruments and medications, and especially to constantly being exposed to enemy fire. Many of them gave their lives trying to save the lives of others. In spite of the primitive conditions, the results of the treatment they dispensed were promising. Over 50% of those with abdominal wounds³³ survived, thanks to prompt and resolute medical attention, operations and other surgical treatments (data for Żoliborz and the City Centre). What undoubtedly contributed to such good results was the fact that combatants were on near-starvation rations, so the digestive system of those with abdominal wounds was practically empty.

The biggest contribution to the death toll came from the Germans’ use of dumdum expanding bullets, which caused a monstrous amount of tissue devastation. The exit hole of a dumdum bullet could be as big as a large saucer. Another factor contributing to the death rate was the crush syndrome (major shock and kidney failure); not much was known about this condition at the time. Curiously, though, not many cases of tetanus were reported, though of course very few casualties could be treated with serum, which was in very short supply. We may conclude that the risk of tetanus is far smaller in an urban environment than in the countryside.

Another surprising fact was the low incidence of infectious diseases. Alleged reports of typhus or dysentery epidemics turned out to be inaccurate. In spite of the very bad and continually deteriorating sanitary conditions, such diseases were not observed to occur in numbers which could have made an effect on the overall situation or been considered an epidemic. This was no doubt due to the administrative and sanitary authorities’ rigorous observance of the vaccination provisions.

While the efforts of doctors and nurses were successful in the medicinal and surgical treatment dispensed to the wounded and other patients, one area in which they were helpless, especially towards the end of the Uprising, was in coping with the growing numbers of patients with the long-term effects of starvation and vitamin deficiency. These disorders tended to affect the elderly and generally more vulnerable individuals. Food shortages and the want of vitamin tablets or ampules ruled out all preventive or remedial measures.

Did the medical service carry out its duties well? Given the conditions in which it had to work, it most probably achieved the maximum of what could have been done. Although surgeons constituted only a fraction of the total number of doctors,³⁴ an appropriate classification of the hospitals and allocation of physicians to them made for a generally high level of professional care. This opinion was confirmed by observations made later of the most serious casualties, following their subsequent evacuation to the hospital in Zeithain POW camp.

Here is the last order issued by the Head of the Medical Service for the City of Warsaw on 2 October 1944: The Head of the Medical Service for the Warsaw Division of the Home Army to the Soldiers of the Medical Service for the Warsaw Division.

[block it] You have added a new chapter to the glorious history of the military medical service. For 64 days and nights you persevered and did your duty, fully committed to your work, and made a superhuman effort, in the worst conditions any medical service has ever had to work. You gave a fine example of service for the cause. The sacrifice many doctors and nurses made of their lives, and the deaths of many of our colleagues will be a perpetual guideline to how we should work. The bravery and dedication displayed by the girls serving in the Women’s Military Force went well beyond their feminine physical powers and made a new contribution to the medical service, of an unprecedented magnitude in comparison with anything that military action has known hitherto. Thank you for all your efforts, concern, and dedication. However, our work is not over yet. We still have our casualties to look after, and they will still need devoted care for a long time to come. That is what I am asking you for, convinced that you will carry out your duty to the full.

Copies to be sent to recipients on the official distribution list.

Col. Bakcyl Dr Henryk Lenk, MD Head of the Medical Service for the Warsaw Division of the Home Army

The message in this order was by no means an exaggeration. On the contrary, they did not, and could not put into words the full scope of the effort and self-sacrifice. Neither will any study ever be able to fully express the realities of those times.

Translated from original article: Stanisław Bayer, “Z historii warszawskich szpitali powstańczych,” Przegląd Lekarski – Oświęcim, 1975.

1. The article describes the Warsaw Uprising of 1 August – 3 October 1944 (not to be confused with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of April 1943).
2. Henryk Lenk (1894–1969) graduated in Medicine from the University of Warsaw in 1926. Served during the defensive campaign of September 1939 as the chief medical officer of 8 Dywizja Piechoty (the Eighth Infantry Division), and later as chief medical officer in the commanding unit for the defence of Modlin. Appointed chief medical officer of the Warsaw Division of the AK (Armia Krajowa, the Home Army, the largest underground resistance force in occupied Europe), 20 Jan. 1941; and served in this capacity during the Warsaw Uprising. Source: Andrzej K. Kunert, Słownik bibliograficzny konspiracji warszawskiej 1939–1945, Warsaw: Pax; 1987, Vol. 2, p. 115. www.1944.pl.
3. The stand-by alert prior to the Warsaw Uprising, which started at 17.00 hours on 1 August 1944.
4. Szpital Dzieciątka Jezus, a large general hospital founded in Warsaw in 1732. Under German occupation during the Second World War it served as a hideout for Polish underground resistance forces.
5. Polish names of the four hospitals: Szpital Wolski, Szpital Karola i Marii, Szpital Św. Łazarza, and Szpital Św. Stanisława.
6. Battalion Zośka was one of the best-known units taking part in the Warsaw Uprising. See the article by Zygmunt Kujawski, “From the Warsaw Uprising to Zeithain POW Camp” soon to be published on this website.
7. The article cites 2 books by Zbigniew Woźniewski, Pierwsze dni powstania warszawskiego w szpitalach na Woli, Warsaw: Lekarski Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy; 1947; and Rys historyczny Szpitala Wolskiego w Warszawie (1877–1939), Warsaw: Lekarski Instytut Naukowo Wydawniczy; 1948.
8. Adolf Falkowski (1886–1962), chief medical officer of St. John’s Hospital, and later of Centralny Powstańczy Szpital Chirurgiczny nr 1 (No. 1 Central Surgical Hospital for the Uprising) at No. 7, ul. Długa. Following evacuation via the municipal sewer network Dr Falkowski served in the hospital on ul. Pierackiego and in St. Roche’s Hospital (Szpital Św. Rocha), and subsequently in Wolski Hospital. Source: www.1944.pl.
9. Stefan Tarnawski (nom-de-guerre Tarło, 1898–2001) graduated from the Faculty of Medicine of Warsaw University in 1926. Chief medical officer of Pułk Szwoleżerów w Mazowieckiej Brygadzie Kawalerii (the Light Cavalry Regiment of the Mazovian Cavalry Brigade) during the defensive campaign of September 1939. One of the medical officers serving in AK Headquarters in 1944, and chief medical officer of Grupa Północ (the Northern Group) during the Uprising. Evacuated via the municipal sewer network to the City Centre (Śródmieście), and as of 5 Sept. 1944 commanding officer of the field hospital at No. 17, ul. Śniadeckich. The Sano Hospital at ul. Lwowska 13 and the field hospital at ul. Lwowska 17 were also subject to his authority. Evacuated with casualties and patients from the Lwowska 17 hospital to Kraków, where he served as commander of Ujazdowski Hospital following its evacuation. Sources: Mariusz Jędrzejko, Mariusz L. Krogulski, and Marek Paszkowski, Generałowie i admirałowie III Rzeczypospolitej: 1989–2002, Warsaw: Von Borowiecky, 2002; www.1944.pl; www.lekarzepowstania.pl.
10. Hour W (Godzina „W”)—code name for the time the Uprising was scheduled to start, 17.00 hours on 1 August.
11. SS-Oberführer Oskar Dirlewanger (26 Sept. 1895–7 Jun. 1945), German war criminal, guilty of numerous atrocities and massacres committed in occupied Europe, including Warsaw during the 1944 Uprising.
12. Ogród Saski, a large municipal park in Central Warsaw.
13. Szpital Ubezpieczalni Społecznej. Also known as Szpital ZUS.
14. Polish Szpital PCK.
15. Polish Instytut Oftalmiczny.
16. Polish Warszawski Szpital dla Dzieci.
17. For 123 years prior to the restoration of Poland’s independence in 1918, the country was divided up between three Partitioning Powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Polish people were citizens of the Partitioning states and obliged to serve in their armies.
18. Polish Szpital Sióstr Św. Elżbiety.
19. On 28 August 1944 the hospital asked for a consignment of red material to make Red Cross flags, which were to protect it against bombing raids. On the following day, despite the flags which had been put up, the hospital was under a bombing raid and a heavy barrage of artillery fire. The Germans did not even spare staff and insurgents carrying out the wounded from the building. The hospital was reduced to ruins, but a first-aid station was set up in the part of the basement which had survived the attack, and continued to work until the end of the defence of Mokotów.
20. Gimnazjum im. Księcia Józefa Poniatowskiego, referred to colloquially as the Poniatówka school.
21. Bursa Rodziny Wojskowej, a lodging house run by a social organisation for members of the Polish forces.
22. Laski, a village in the western suburbs of Warsaw, with a home and boarding school for the blind located in it.
23. The Kampinos Forest, a large area of woodland, now a National Park, situated about 45 km north-west of Central Warsaw.
24. Polish Szpital Św. Rocha.
25. Polish Klinika Pediatryczna.
26. On 3 August Ukrainian troops from the Kaminski Regiment of collaborators with the Germans entered the hospital and committed a number of thefts and rapes. Cf. http://www.szpitale1944.pl/i/163,szpital-dzieciatka-jezus
27. Tworki—a large psychiatric hospital on the south-western outskirts of Warsaw, established in the late 19^th century.
28. During the Uprising and after its fall, the Germans forced Warsaw’s civilian inhabitants (nearly 550 thousand) to leave the city and set about demolishing what was left of its buildings. The insurgents were captured and either killed or taken to POW camps in Germany.
29. 25 municipal hospitals, about 122 field hospitals, and about 200 first aid stations were in operation during the Uprising.
30. 906 doctors and about 5,000 nurses and orderlies took part in the Uprising.
31. According to the latest research by Marek Getter, the number of wounded insurgents was up to 20 thousand, with 5 thousand serious injuries. According to the findings of Anna Marek, about 50 thousand wounded insurgents and civilians were treated in the medical stations during the Uprising. Sources: Marek Getter, “Straty ludzkie i materialne w Powstaniu Warszawskim,” Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej. 2004: 8-9, p. 67 and 70; Anna Marek, Leczenie ran w Powstaniu Warszawskim 1 sierpnia–2 października 1944. Warsaw: Bellona, 2004.
32. Col. Chirurg (“Col. Surgeon”), Stanisław Weber, Chief of Staff in the AK High Command for the City of Warsaw (1906–1990).
33. According to Anna Marek’s research, the mortality for abdominal wounds was 60–80%, depending on the hospital or medical station, in other words, 20–40% of abdominal casualties survived. Wounds in the abdomen were very serious injuries, often involving many organs and tended to be fatal if the peritoneum was perforated. The death rate was so high not because of lack of skill on the part of the doctors, but because of a lack of medications (sulphonamides were in very short supply, and antibiotics had not yet reached Occupied Poland). Another factor which contributed to the death toll were the conditions in which the wounded were treated. Anna Marek, Leczenie ran w Powstaniu Warszawskim 1 sierpnia–2 października 1944. Warsaw: Bellona; 2004, p. 248 and 258.
34. 906 doctors provided their medical services for the Warsaw Uprising. Researchers have managed to establish the specialist fields of only 262 of them. We know there were 99 surgeons, 41 internal medicine specialists, 27 gynaecologists, 19 dentists, 16 ophthalmic opticians, 15 children’s doctors, 8 dermatologists, 7 radiologists, 5 laryngologists, 3 specialists of anatomical pathology, 3 orthopaedics specialists, 3 psychiatrists, and 2 bacteriologists. One doctor represented each of the following specialist disciplines: anatomy, epidemiology, haematology, cardiology, neurosurgery, urology, and oncology. Source: Halina Jędrzejewska, “Lekarze Powstania Warszawskiego 1 VIII-2 X 1944,” Pamiętnik Towarzystwa Lekarskiego Warszawskiego. 2006(10), p. 14.
35. Most probably a reference to Zbrodnie okupanta w czasie powstania warszawskiego w 1944 r. (w dokumentach), Szymon Datner and Kazimierz Leszczyński (eds.). Warsaw: MON, 1962.

Notes courtesy of Anna Marek, Expert Consultant in the history of medicine for the Medical Review Auschwitz project, and Teresa Bałuk-Ulewiczowa, the project’s Head Translator.

      

A publication funded in 2020–2021 within the DIALOG Program of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in Poland.